We propose a novel discrete-time dynamical systembased framework for achieving adversarial robustness in machine learning models. Our algorithm is originated from robust optimization, which aims to find the saddle point of a min-max optimization problem in the presence of uncertainties. The robust learning problem is formulated as a robust optimization problem, and we introduce a discretetime algorithm based on a saddle-point dynamical system (SDS) to solve this problem. Under the assumptions that the cost function is convex and uncertainties enter concavely in the robust learning problem, we analytically show that using a diminishing step-size, the stochastic version of our algorithm, SSDS converges asymptotically to the robust optimal solution. The algorithm is deployed for the training of adversarially robust deep neural networks. Although such training involves highly non-convex non-concave robust optimization problems, empirical results show that the algorithm can achieve significant robustness for deep learning. We compare the performance of our SSDS model to other state-of-the-art robust models, e.g., trained using the projected gradient descent (PGD)-training approach. From the empirical results, we find that SSDS training is computationally inexpensive (compared to PGD-training) while achieving comparable performances. SSDS training also helps robust models to maintain a relatively high level of performance for clean data as well as under black-box attacks.
Introduction
The success of adversarial perturbations to input data for deep learning models poses a significant challenge for the machine learning community. The need becomes safety-and life-critical, considering the application of deep learning based perception system for self-driving cars or security applica-tions 5, 25 . While pure white-box attacks 5, 8, 13, 17, 19, 27 (where an adversary has full knowledge of the machine learning model) could be difficult to execute in practice, researchers have shown strong transferability of attacks 21 that can still cause significant damage.
As attacks became more and more powerful, several defense strategies have also been proposed. A popular category of defense strategy is adversarial training, where adversarial examples are added to the training set followed by training the network using the augmented dataset 13, 27 . However, such methods seem to be quite sensitive to adversarial budget used for generating the adversarial examples as well as other training hyper-parameters. A more powerful and stable defense mechanism stems from decoupling the min-max robust optimization problem 18 related to robust learning using the Danskin's theorem 10 . Here, the inner maximization refers to finding the adversarial perturbation that would maximize the training loss. On the other hand, the outer maximization deals with minimization of the training loss for the perturbed inputs. The decoupling process leads to the class of algorithms where, at a training epoch, one can find the worst-case attacks concerning the current model. Then a model parameter update step is executed following the traditional training process using perturbed training set with the worst-case attacks. However, finding the worst-case perturbation for deep learning models is quite non-trivial and cannot be guaranteed primarily due to the highly non-convex nature of the cost surface. Typically, powerful attacks such as fast gradient sign method (FGSM) 13 , Carlini-Wagner (CW) 8 and projected gradient descent (PGD) 18 are run in order to find the worst-case perturbations at every training epoch. However, it is observed empirically that the attacks with higher computational budgets seem to be more successful in approximating the worst-case perturbations, e.g., 20 step PGD is much stronger than a single step PGD. Therefore, it is usually quite expensive computationally to find a robust deep learning model. Besides, there still remains a significant gap in the literature, in crafting theoretically sound algorithms for robust learning. Apart from a few studies, e.g., by Shaham et al. 23 that proposed a framework to justify the performance of adversarial training theoretically, this area has not been explored sufficiently.
In this paper, we introduce a new algorithm for adversarial training of Deep Neural Networks (DNN) based on continuous and discrete-time saddle point dynamical system introduced in 11 for solving robust optimization (RO) problem 4 . Specifically, we introduce the stochastic variant of deterministic saddlepoint dynamical system (SDS) referred to as SSDS for robust learning. The stochastic variant is useful in stochastic gradient descent (SGD) setting, typical for training of DNN. The min-max optimization problem that arises in adversarial training of DNN is formulated as RO problem. The objective of the proposed SSDS algorithm is to converge to the minmax saddle point.
Unlike existing approaches, our proposed algorithm does not decouple the minimization and maximization problems involved in robust optimization. Instead, it attempts to solve both problems simultaneously by evolving both the model parameters and the adversarial perturbations through the training epochs. As we do not attempt to find the worst-case perturbations at every training epoch, we save significant computation overhead as compared to other methods such as PGD-training 18 and TRADES 32 . While there are recent efforts to mitigate the computational overhead by using random projections 29 instead of finding the worst case attacks, our approach is fundamentally different as we still try to solve the coupled robust optimization problem while reducing the computations overhead. To this end, in addition to model parameters and the adversarial perturbations, we also evolve two Lagrangian multipliers through the training epochs, one for the model parameters and the other for the adversarial perturbations. Under the assumptions of convex cost function and concave uncertainties, we analytically show that using a diminishing step-size, our SSDS algorithm converges asymptotically to the robust optimal solution. We also present extensive experimental results using CIFAR-10 and comparison with the state-of-the-art for validation.
Contributions: Specifically, our contributions are: (i) A new saddle-point dynamical systems approach to robust learning for finding a robust model and the corresponding worst-case adversarial perturbations, (ii) a new Stochastic Saddle-point Dynamical Systems (SSDS) algorithm appropriate for robust deep learning, (iii) analysis of convergence for SSDS under certain restrictive assumptions (iv) empirical results to show that the proposed approach is a computationally inexpensive way to train robust models for white-and black-box attacks as well as maintain a relatively high level of performance for clean data.
Related Work
Due to space constraints and a large amount of recent progress on adversarial machine learning, our discussion of related work is necessarily incomplete. Here, we attempt to discuss the most recent & relevant literature. We divide the section as: (1) adversarial attack/defense and (2) robust optimization.
Adversarial Attack and Defense: Initial evidence of the vulnerability of deep classifiers to imperceptible adversarial perturbations was shown by 27 . Around the same time, Biggio et al. 5 showed that SVMs could malfunction in security-sensitive applications and proposed a regularization term in the classifiers. In the deep learning community, Goodfellow et al. 13 and Kurakin et al. 17 proposed the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) and its iterative variants as powerful attack strategies to fool deep learning models. While these methods mainly focused on white box attacks, Papernot et al. 21 introduced the notion of black-box attacks where the adversary does not have complete knowledge of the learning model. Attacks can also be categorized into test-time 5 and train-time (also known as data poisoning) attacks 16 , and targeted and non-targeted attacks 2 . In this paper, we only focus on test-time, non-targeted attacks.
Several defense approaches have been proposed in the literature, such as using denoising autoencodersbased Deep Contractive Networks 14 , and defining a network robustness metric 3 . However, as discussed in the introduction, the most popular robust deep learning methods involve some form of adversarial training 13,18,23,28 . Defensive distillation 20 is also another method of defense which showed fascinating results. However, Carlini and Wagner 8 could break such a defense mechanism by proposing multiple adversarial loss functions. Athalye et al. 1 further analyzed various defense approaches and demonstrated that most existing defenses could be beaten by approximating gradients over defensively trained models. In this paper, we only focus on defense for perception models such as deep CNN.
Robust Optimization: Authors in 23 show that adversarial training of neural networks is, in fact, robustification of the network optimization that can be exploited to increase the local stability of neural networks. Robust optimization has also been used in 9 to find an approximately optimal minmax solution that optimizes for non-convex objectives. This method is based on a reduction from robust optimization to stochastic optimization. Here an α-approximate stochastic oracle is given, and αapproximate robust optimization in a convexified solution space is obtained. Nonetheless, ideas from robust optimization (closely related to regularization in machine learning 26,30 ) for solving robust learning problems has not been explored sufficiently.
Problem Formulation
We first state the robust learning problem from a robust optimization viewpoint to provide the framework for solving robust deep learning problems with the saddle-point dynamics approach.
Robust Learning as a Robust Optimization Problem
We consider a standard classification task under a data distribution D over the dataset I = {I (1) , I (2) , · · · , I (N) }, where, I (i) ∈ R m with set of labels, y. The loss function (e.g., cross-entropy loss) is denoted by L(I, y, w) with w ∈ R n as the model parameters (decision variables). From a robust optimization (RO) perspective 11 , robust learning can be written as
where, the loss function L is also a function of additive perturbation or uncertainty u (constrained by uncertainty set U ) to the input.
Following the standard practice in machine learning, we approximate the expected loss with empirical loss for a finite number of i.i.d training samples,
We consider u (i) as the corresponding uncertainty for the data point I (i) . Hence, RO problem (1) can be written as
The fundamental assumption in RO is that the uncertainty variables reside within the uncertainty sets
where the h (i) functions representing the uncertainty sets are typically assumed to be convex functions such as norm-bound budgets. The goal here is to obtain model parameters, w, (e.g., weights, θ and biases, b for neural networks) that work well for all possible uncertainty parameter realizations within the uncertainty sets.
We assume that the RO problem (1) has at least one robust feasible solution. Further, we make the following assumption for the functions in the RO problem (1) 11 . Assumption 1. L(I + u, y, w) is strictly convex in w and each L(I (i) + u (i) , y (i) , w) is strictly concave in u (i) . Moreover, each h (i) (u (i) ) is convex in u (i) , and each U (i) needs to be a compact (and convex) set for i = 1, . . . , N. Moreover, norm of L and h (i) s and their subgradients are bounded on compact sets.
Based on the epigraph form of an optimization problem 7 , we rewrite RO problem (1) as
which is an equivalent, albeit more convenient form for our framework, where t is being added to the vector of model parameters as an auxiliary decision variable. We define the saddle and KKT point of the RO problem later and discuss their properties briefly.
Defining a Lagrangian multiplier λ ≥ 0 and the vector of model parameters as x := (w, t), the optimization problem (3) can be written as
Then the total Lagrangian for the RO problem can be written as
where v (i) s are the Lagrangian multipliers for the lower level maximization problem. Derivation of the Lagrangian function along with the definition and properties of the saddle and KKT point of RO problem can be found in the supplementary material. Note that the proposed discrete framework for training adversarial deep learning models stems from the continuous-time dynamical system concepts and tools (e.g., Lyapunov theory) for solving robust optimization (RO) 11 . Typically, loss function in an RO framework is considered to be a function of just the model parameters, not the uncertainty. Therefore, we formulate the algorithm with Lagrangian multipliers that ensure satisfaction of the attack budget asymptotically without hard projections. This formulation also helps in analysis.
Saddle-Point Dynamical System Algorithm
Following the discussion in the previous section, we now propose the algorithms for both deterministic and stochastic saddle-point dynamical system. For simplicity, we are going to call them "SDS" for deterministic and "SSDS" for stochastic case. Defining x = (w, t), the discrete-time saddle-point dynamics method finds the saddle point of the Lagrangian function by the iterations
Noting the u (i) update, we observe that the above saddle discrete dynamics for finding the robust optimal solution of RO problem differs from the primaldual dynamics for deterministic problems 12 . This is because the vector field for the above algorithm is not obtained by taking the total Lagrangian's subgradient. Defining a set-valued mapping including subgradient functions of the Lagrangian function (4) components as
. . , N, the adaptive diminishing step-size in the above algorithm is defined as
Following theorem is the main result for asymptotic convergence of the discrete-time saddle point algorithm with diminishing step-size. We show that algorithm (5)-(8) converges to the KKT point (equivalent to the saddle point as specified in the supplementary material) of RO problem. Theorem 2. Under Assumption 1 and the additional assumption that λ > 0 where λ is the saddle point of the Lagrangian (4) for λ part, the saddle point dynamics (5)-(8) converges asymptotically to the robust optimal solution with the adaptive diminishing step-size satisfying (9). Remark 1. Although the stability is not shown in this paper, we observe in practice that the dynamics without λ in v-update (8) works for both active and inactive constraints (whether λ is positive or zero) of the RO problem and converges to the KKT point. Therefore, we propose removing λ from v-update to use in practice for solving the RO problem. Remark 2. Convergence results are also proved where the adaptive step-size is replaced with constant step-size, say α, in the algorithm (5)-(8). In particular, with a constant step-size, convergence rate of o( 1 k ) can be proved for the Lagrangian function L in (4) as
where (x , λ , u , v ) specifies the saddle point, c 1 is some constant, and lim α→0 c 0 (α) → 0.
Stochastic Saddle-point Dynamical System (SSDS) Algorithm
The deterministic saddle point algorithm presented above is modified to account for the stochastic effect inherent in the implementation of optimization algorithms (e.g., SGD) involving a large training set.
To reduce the computational burden of calculating batch gradients for a large training set, typically the gradient of loss function is computed for a randomly selected data point (simple SGD) or a small batch of data points (mini-batch SGD). Following similar works in 6 for a simple SGD setting, we define x :
where ξ ∈ {1, . . . , N} is a random variable modeling the process for randomly selecting a data point out of N possible samples. Furthermore, we define
With these notations, the stochastic version of the deterministic saddle point algorithm is written as follows:
where, ξ k is assumed to be independent identically distributed random process and α k is the adaptive step-size in (9), and following assumptions are made on f , g and h (i) s. Note that the weights x is updated using the loss function information at randomly selected image u ξ , however the uncertain variable u i corresponding to all the images are updated. Assumption 3. We assume that f (x) is convex in x and each h (i) (u (i) ) is convex in u (i) . Moreover, g(x, u, ξ) is convex in x and is strictly concave in u for any fixed value of ξ. Remark 3. Clearly, the assumptions of strict convexity of f and concavity of g are not satisfied in the DNN setting. The strict convexity and strict concavity assumptions could be relaxed with weaker convergence results than the one reported below. This is the topic of current investigation. Theorem 4. Let Assumption 3 be satisfied and λ > 0, then, following is true for the SSDS algorithm with adaptive step-size α k satisfying (9).
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Mini-batch Implementation of SSDS Algorithm
In an attempt to use the proposed approach for robust training of DNN, we propose a mini-batch stochastic version of the SSDS in algorithm 1 to achieve a more stable convergence. As stated above, the SSDS algorithm involves the decision variable x := (t, w), where ws are the parameters of DNN. For simplicity of implementation, we first separate the update rule for x, described in (11). In other words, we split the updates of w and t that also enables us to use standard learning rates (denoted by lr) for the w updates. For the updates of t and other SSDS variables, such as λ, u and v, we use a diminishing step-size α k . However, we refrain from applying the diminishing step-size described in (9) due to the sheer complexity involved in taking the norm of the parameters for a large-scale neural network. In-stead, we use an exponentially decaying diminishing step-size, α k+1 = α k e −kp , where p is the decay rate for exponentially diminishing stepsize and k is the epoch number. Note that the updates of u and λ can succumb to scaling issues depending of the values of the gradients and variable v k . Therefore, we add two scaling factors C 1 and C 2 in the update rules of u and λ to bring different terms of the update laws to the same scale. Given a data set and a model architecture, appropriate values can be found with a few trial and error steps.Due to the separation of the updates, another small departure in our implementation from the prescribed algorithm is -while w updates are performed for every mini-batch (m j refers to the j th mini-batch of k th epoch) , the other updates are performed once every epoch. Also, in the original formulation, we continuously update u corresponding to all the images while the w is updated using the gradient information of the loss function evaluated at randomly selected images. In the algorithm implementation however, u is also updated only corresponding to the randomly selected images based on which the network weights are updated. This helps in reducing computation for large training sets.
Based on the above setup, the mini-batch SSDS algorithm is presented in Algorithm 1.
We can also craft attacks based on the SSDS algorithm. To do that, we run iterative updates of the perturbations u given a test sample along with its corresponding Lagrangian multiplier v, keeping the model (w ) and λ * fixed. The attack algorithm is discussed in the supplementary material.
Experimental Results
Most robust learning papers consider only CIFAR-10 and MNIST, where performances on MNIST data sets are usually difficult to differentiate. We see the same trend for MNIST as seen with CIFAR-10. Therefore, We validate the proposed SSDS algorithm empirically on the CIFAR-10 dataset Specifically, we demonstrate the convergence characteristics of the algorithm along with performance comparison with benchmark techniques. We use the Resnet 50 15 and VGG19 24 model architectures and the software implementation is done in Pytorch 22 . The codes will be made available upon acceptance of the paper. The key hyper-parameters of the proposed algorithm are chosen as: lr = 0.001, ε = 0.03, p = 0.001, C 1 = C 2 = 0.01. Through repeated trial and error, we find the following suitable initializations: λ 0 = 4, α 0 = 2, t 0 = 0 and u 0 = 0, v 0 = 1, for all input images.
SSDS convergence characterisitcs
We begin this discussion with general training accuracy and loss plots shown in Fig. 1 for minibatch SSDS algorithm for the CIFAR-10 dataset using VGG19 model architecture. The ∞ -norm attack budget was chosen to be 0.03 or 3% of the maximum pixel intensity (comparable with previous works in this area 18, 33 ). We also observe the accuracy values for the clean test set during the training process. Additionally, we plot the histogram of ∞ -norms of final perturbations added to the training images for a few epochs during the training process (see Fig. 1c ). This is to verify the theoretical claim that the final perturbations for the training images should converge at or below the budget. From the empirical results shown in Fig. 1c , we make the observation that although perturbations for some images spill over the threshold value (0.03) during the course of the training process, most of the perturbations converge within the bound eventually (interestingly, a large number of the perturbations settle below the threshold).
Next, we focus on a specific training sample to understand how the dynamics for different variables in the algorithm evolve during the course of the training process. A randomly chosen training image is shown in Fig. 2a along with the corresponding final perturbation generated by the algorithm and corrupted adversarial version of the image. We observe the dynamics of v over the training epochs. In this experiment, v was initialized at 1 (for all of the images in the training set), and it converges to 0 after around epoch 180. Similarly, as shown in Fig. 2c , ∞norm of the perturbation generated for the chosen image converges to 0.026 which is below the specified budget. However, the actual perturbations for individual pixels still continue to evolve even after the ∞ -norm for the entire perturbation matrix settles down. To monitor the perturbations for the individual pixels, we plot 2 norm of the difference between the perturbations for two consecutive epochs. We see that this metric finally converges to 0 around epoch 300. At this point, the overall training process also converges except for small changes due to the stochastic nature of the training algorithm.
Model evaluation
We begin with performance comparison of SSDS-p with PGD-training (trained with 20 PGD steps and 10 random starts 18,33 ) and FGSM-training 17 on various white-box attacks, such as FGSM, 20 step PGD and SSDS-p attacks (see Table 1 ). We also keep the Next, we evaluate our defense method for black box attacks. We use our (SSDS-p) Resnet50 model for defending against 7 step PGD attacks generated using a naturally trained model. From Table 2 , we observe that our accuracy is significantly better compared that of a 20 step-PGD model with the same architecture. Then we perform a head-to-head comparison where we try to defend against 7 step PGD attacks generated using a 20 step-PGD model with SSDS-p training and vice-versa. The SSDS-p training performs better in this case as well (See Table 2 ).
We then extend our experiments to the running time comparison between SSDS and PGD. that algorithm is extremely similar to PGD training (except for a new loss function for improved adversarial accuracy) from a computational perspective. Therefore, our approach still remains fundamentally different and computationally significantly more efficient. Supplementary material) . We observe that SSDSp training performs significantly better than FGSMtraining for all attacks (see Table 3 ). SSDS-p significantly outperforms 20 step PGD-training on clean and FGSM corrupted images as well. Interestingly, SSDS-p performance on clean data is very close to that of natural training. However, PGD-training works better for PGD corrupted images. On the other hand, SSDS-p training performs better in classifying the SSDS-p corrupted images compared to PGD-training. We also used our defense model to defend against test cases generated by Madry et al. 18 models which are discussed in the Supplementary material.
To further explore the trade-off between computa- tional cost and accuracy, we extend our experiments to different computation and attack budgets. We used different steps of PGD models to compare our model with a less computationally expensive one. In order to compare the performance of SSDS-p model with k step PGD model for various k values, we train different k step PGD models and test each of them with their corresponding attack protocols, e.g., we test a 5 step PGD model with 5 step PGD attack and so on. As shown in Fig. 4a , we see that the SSDS-p model outperforms k step PGD models until k = 5, while being significantly better in terms of computation overhead. We also note that apart from training time per epoch, SSDS-p usually converges in much less number of epochs as compared to PGD training. Therefore, the total training time becomes even shorter for SSDS-p. Finally, we consider the performance of our model trained with ∞ budget of 0.03 under different attack budgets. In 18 , authors observed that as the attack budget (ε) increases, the 20 step PGD model loses accuracy almost exponentially for the CIFAR-10 data set. In contrast, SSDS-p model accuracy saturates after 4%, eventually outperforming PGD-training around ε = 8%. (see Fig. 4b ) 
Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a new saddle-point dynamical systems approach to solve the robust learning problem. Under certain restrictive assumptions, we present a detailed convergence analysis for the stochastic version of our algorithm. Empirically, we show that the proposed scheme is a computationally inexpensive method that maintains a high level of performance for clean and corrupted input data, both for white-box and black-box attacks We believe that this can be attributed to the fact that the adversarial training in SSDS also acts as a form of regularization. This notion is based on the equivalence between the robust optimization problem and many regularization problems 26 . Finally, we note that this is an early attempt to adopting a dynamical systems approach to robust learning. Therefore, future research will focus on relaxing some of the restrictive assumptions in the analysis for the loss function and uncertainties. Similarly, we will focus on developing the SSDS algorithm further to better handle the highly non-convex nature of deep network loss functions, leading to a more competitive performance with computationally intensive adversarial training processes.
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Supplementary Material
Additional proofs and experimental results will be discussed here; also more information about the material in the main body of the paper will be added here.
Additional Theorems and Derivations
We consider the following definitions in this section
Lagrangian function derivation
First, we derive the Lagrangian function in (4) . The lower level optimization problem in the RO problem (1) can be written as an optimization problem parametrized by x such that
Denote v (i) s as Lagrangian multipliers for the lower level maximization problem and define v := [v 1 , . . . , v N ] . The role of each v (i) multiplier is to satisfy the uncertainty set constraint associated with the perturbation u (i) . Based on the Lagrangian theory, one can equivalently write
Hence, RO problem can be written as
Therefore, one can derive the total Lagrangian as in (4) .
Saddle and KKT point of the RO problem
The following theorem can be stated for the saddle point of the optimization problem (1). Theorem 5. Consider the Lagrangian function as defined in (4) . Under Assumption 1, following statements are true for the optimization problem (1)
. . , N . Hence, the Lagrangian function (4) has a saddle point.
Proof. For the ease of notations, consider the RO problem with single constraint and single uncertainty set as
The general case (1) with multiple uncertainty sets can be proved along similar lines. The Lagrangian for upper level problem in (20) is
g(x, u) .
We can write the total Lagrangian for (20) as
Hence, we can write
= min
.
We now show that µ = min 
So,
From strong duality for the parametric optimization problem (21), we have
Now, consider the second part in (9), that is
Starting from the first max u at right, we get
Then, consider max λ≥0 as max λ≥0 0
which is equal to γ as claimed in (22). Since minimizations (maximizations) can always be combined, the above result shows that
Note that L is (jointly) convex in (x, v), but it is not (jointly) concave in (λ, u); although it is concave in each of these variables. We next show that notwithstanding this issue, the optimal solution to µ is a saddle point. Specifically, we show that
To show this, note that strong duality in the upper level parametric optimization problem in (20) implies
where the last equality comes from the definition of G(x) in (21). To obtain the result in (24), we need to show that for any λ ≥ 0 ,
λg(x, u) .
Thus,
Since g(x, u) is convex in x and concave in u as for Assumption 1, so f (x) + λg(x, u) has the same properties for λ ≥ 0. It follows that the result does not change if we swap the order of the optimizations. Hence,
which completes the proof of Theorem 5.
Let z = (x , λ , u , v ) be the saddle point for the Lagrangian (4). Using the result of Theorem 5, it follows that z enjoys the saddle point property, namely
From the above discussion on the development of Lagrangian function L, it follows that RO problem can be viewed as two connected optimization problems. The lower level optimization problem (17) parameterized by x involving maximization over uncertain variables u (i) s and the upper level optimization problem involving minimization over the decision variable x. This insight can be used to define the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions for the RO problem as follows. Definition 1.
Recalling that x = (w, t), the KKT point (x , λ , u , v ) for the RO problem (1) can be defined as follows
where ∂ x f is the notation for the gradient of f w.r.t.
x, L defined in (4), and
We now propose the following fundamental theorem on establishing the connection between the KKT and saddle point of the RO problem. 
Since (x , v ) minimizes the Lagrangian, we have
Similarly, using complimentary slackness condition and the fact that
Hence,
To show complimentary slackness, consider the optimization problem with fixed x = x as max u (i) ,∀i g(x , u) s.t. h (i) (u (i) ) ≤ 0 , i = 1, . . . , N .
With g concave in u and each h (i) convex in u (i) , the above problem is convex with zero duality gap and hence, based on convex optimization theory 7 , we have
. The first inequality is true because h (i) (u (i) ) ≤ 0 and v (i) ≥ 0. Hence, from the last inequality we get v (i) h (i) (u (i) ) = 0. We next show that λ g(x , u ) = 0. For fixed u , consider the optimization problem
For fixed u , above is a convex optimization problem and hence, we have zero duality gap. Then similarly,
The first inequality is true because g(x , u ) ≤ 0, and hence, the last inequality implies λ g(x , u ) = 0. This completes the proof of Theorem 6.
We can specify the equilibrium point (x , λ , u , v ) of the dynamical system (11)- (14) as
for i = 1, . . . , N. The above conditions can also be viewed as the generalization of the KKT conditions from the deterministic setting to stochastic setting. Furthermore, by defining the Lagrangian function,
, following generalization of saddle point condition from deterministic setting (25) to stochastic setting can be considered
Convergence Proof of Stochastic Version of the Algorithm
For the convergence proof of SSDS algorithm in (11)-(14), we will assume λ > 0 and that numbers R and R λ ≤ R are known satisfying
We will also assume that the norm of the subgradients of f , g and h (i) s, and the values of f , g and h (i) s are bounded on compact sets based on Assumption 1. Let us start by defining the compact notations
By using the non-expansive property of positive projection operations for λ and v iterations, we write out the following basic equations
Using the compact notation, this reads to be
Considering the upper bound R λ for two-norm of λ , we can write
k . Taking expectation on both the sides with respect to E ξ k−1 0 on both the sides and using the fact that ξ k−1 0 is independent of ξ k , we obtain
where C is defined as max{1, R λ }. Substituting inequality (9) into (8) we obtain
has to go to zero in the limit. From Remark 4, we conclude that
Experimental Results
In this section, more elaborations about SSDS algorithm will be provided, and different experiments using SSDS-p algorithm will be discussed.
SSDS-p Model Convergence Results
As discussed in the main paper, although SSDS can control the perturbations to remain under the budget for most of the data points, we add a projection term for the u update in order to make sure that we are always perturbing within the budget. Fig. 5 shows the accuracy and loss value plots for SSDS-p training. Also, as shown in Fig. 7 , for SSDS-p algorithm u ∞ never goes beyond the budget and the ∞ norm of the final perturbations stays at the specified budget (0.03 here) for the majority of the images in the dataset (see Fig. 5c ). Similar to the observation we made for SSDS case, v converges shortly after the evolution starts (at epoch 180 here), but the dynamics for finding the desired attack, u k − u K−1 2 converges to zero later (epoch 250 here). Fig. 7a shows how the natural image, final attack, and the final corrupted image look like.
SSDS and SSDS-p attacks
As discussed in Section 1, SSDS attacks are found through an iterative process by freezing the model (w ) and λ and using the update rules for u and v. Therefore, we follow the steps discussed in algorithm 2 for SSDS attacks. The notion holds for SSDSp attacks except for the projection term which keeps the attacks within the budget at all times. Table 1 , and as the plots are showing, the accuracy is high in the beginning when the algorithm hasn't still converged and the final perturbation is still not found, but as the final perturbation Algorithm 2 SSDS attack algorithm 1: Input: ε, p, C 1 , w 2: Initialization:u 0 , v 0 , α 0 3: for k ∈ {1, ..., K} do 4 :
α k+1 = α k e −kp 7: end for is found, the accuracy stays fixed at the testing accuracy of the corresponding model on SSDS-p attack. Fig.  9 shows the visual differences between these three attacks on a randomly selected image. The clean image(left), the corresponding corruption(center) and the corrupted image (right) are provided for each method. Figs. 9b and 9a show that the notion of imperceptibility holds for SSDS and PGD attacks, where as FGSM perturbations are much less imperceptible.
Evolution of the attacks
Based on what we discussed in previous chapters, the SSDS algorithm goes through an iterative process for finding the adversary. Therefore, the attack pattern evolves significantly as the algorithm progresses. As shown in Fig. 10 , the attack pattern changes until the final attack is found, and then it remains almost the same after the algorithm converges (here at epoch 260).
VGG model evaluation Under transfer attacks:
We note that for all the white-box results presented in Table 3 , we use a VGG19 15 model architecture with the same set of hyper-parameters. However, Madry et al. 18 used a wide Resnet model 31 trained with a very large number of epochs (80000 epochs) to achieve the state-of-the-art robust models. Therefore, we also tested our SSDS-p robust model on the corrupt test cases generated by Madry et al. In this regard, the accuracy values reported in the first 3 columns of Table 4 are directly borrowed from 18 . Our SSDS-p trained model (still a VGG-19 model) demonstrates a strong performance on these benchmark data sets. However, these attacks are transfer attacks for the SSDS-p model while they are white box attacks for the other models listed here. Therefore, SSDS-p model is expected to perform slightly better in these cases 21 . More interestingly, we find that the SSDS-p model performs significantly better than the wide PGD model in a pure black-box setting. While the wide PGD model has a black-box accuracy of 64.2% under a 7 step PGD attack as reported in 18 , SSDS-p has an accuracy of 69.58%. Note that the model used in this experiment is trained for longer time (3000 epochs) whereas the model used in white-box evaluation experiment ( Table 3) is trained for 1000 epochs. Therefore, the test accuracy of SSDS-P model on clean images is slightly higher compared to the same accuracy reported in Table 3 . Similar to what we did for the Resnet50 model, We compare the running time for SSDS-p and k-step PGD for our VGG19 model. Fig. 6 shows 
